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Dodrant-homomorphic Encryption for
Cloud Databases Using Table Lookup
Thomas Schwarz

Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract:
Users of large commercial databases increasingly want to outsource their database operations to a
cloud service providers, but guaranteeing the privacy of data in an outsourced database has become the
major obstacle to this move. Encrypting all data solves the privacy issue, but makes many operations on
the data impossible in the cloud, unless the service provider has the capacity to decrypt data
temporarily. Homomorphic encryption would solve this issue, but despite great and on-going progress, it
is still far from being operationally feasible. In 2015, we presented what we now call dodranthomomorphic encryption, a method that encrypts numeric values deterministically using the additively
homomorphic Paillier encryption and uses table lookup in order to implement multiplications. We
discuss here the security implications of determinism and discuss options to avoid these pitfalls.

Introduction
There is an increasing trend towards moving databases to the cloud, more specifically, towards
Databases-as-a-Service (DBaaS). Google's Big Query, Amazon RDS, and Microsoft SQL Azure are
commercial examples. DBaaS offers many advantages5,6 for query processing in the cloud, but actual or
perceived lack of privacy is a major obstacle to wide-spread adoption. Encryption solves these issues
since it protects “Data at Rest”, but encryption also obstructs query processing. The obvious solution is
to ship all data back to the data owner or to a trusted site,8 but most tables are too large to make this
practical and it would defeat the purpose of DBaaS. Sophisticated systems such as Monomi14 still use the
client for processing when other options fail.7 A different avenue is the use of a trusted component such
as IBM's cryptocard/secure coprocessor or IBM's Hardware Security Module.10,11 Because these
components are memory and storage limited, data is stored in encrypted form, shipped in small batches
to the trusted component where they are decrypted and processed. Systems like Cipherbase2,3 and
TrustedDB4 take this road. Workable homomorphic encryption would offer a simple solution, since it
allows direct processing of encrypted data. Unfortunately, despite great progress, it is still far away from
reality.
We proposed recently dodrant encryption that uses somewhat deterministic encryption in conjunction
with semi-homomorphic encryption and logarithm and anti-logarithm tables to expand the set of
numerical SQL queries that can be performed.9 We see our goal as a stop-gap measure until the
advances in cryptography lead to a practical method for homomorphic or almost homomorphic
encryption.

Many cryptosystems with added properties (such as order preservation) can leak information in a way
that can be leveraged by an adversary. Deterministic encryption leaks identity, which can be used in a
frequency attack. If in addition the adversary can calculate certain expressions - a danger that will be
hard to thwart in our system - then the adversary can go through all values in an encrypted numerical
table and determine certain values. By calculation, the adversary can generate many more values (such
as all integers within a certain range) and decrypt large parts of the database table column. Finally, the
presence of an encrypted value as a key in a table also provides information to the adversary. Thus, for
our purposes, information leakage is an even more serious problem.

Dodrant-Homomorphic Encryption
We now describe our proposal for dodrant-homomorphic encryption of numerical attributes of a
database. We use Paillier's scheme, defining
(1)

𝜖𝜖:Z → Z𝑁𝑁 ; 𝑥𝑥 → 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥) = 𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥 𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁 (mod 𝑁𝑁 2 )

with a product 𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝(1 of two large, safe primes and 𝑔𝑔 ∈ Z𝑁𝑁2 of order a multiple of N. For normal use
of Paillier's system, 𝑟𝑟 ∈ Z∗𝑁𝑁 is a random number. We however will pick and choose r, for which reason
we call it the Paillier multiplier. The semi-homomorphic property is

(2) 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥) ⋅ 𝜖𝜖𝑠𝑠 (𝑦𝑦)(=

𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥+𝑦𝑦 (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)𝑁𝑁 (mod 𝑁𝑁 2 )) = 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦),

which allows addition of encrypted values. Note that Paillier's “random” components r and s are
multiplied. For subtraction, we can use
(3) 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥) ⋅ 𝜖𝜖𝑠𝑠 (−𝑦𝑦)
or

(4) 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥)/𝜖𝜖𝑠𝑠 (𝑦𝑦)

= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦)

= 𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥−𝑦𝑦 (𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 −1 )𝑁𝑁 (mod 𝑁𝑁 2 ) = 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟/𝑠𝑠 (𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦)

Paillier's cryptosystem also allows multiplying an encrypted value with an unencrypted constant c,
namely
(5) 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐)

= 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (mod 𝑁𝑁 2 ) = 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥)𝑐𝑐 .

Databases store numerical data as decimal numbers with a fixed precision and with a fixed range or as
integers in a fixed range. We convert all decimal numbers to integers by using a scale factor that is
constant for the attribute. For instance, in order to o represent dollar amounts up to one million dollars,
we need 100 million values, starting with 0.00𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ. These values are encoded as cents, i.e.
as 0, … 99999999, using a scale factor of two. If we want to calculate 5% of a dollar amount, we encode
the 5% = 0.05 as 5. If the amount is $5.99, we multiply the stored value of 599 with 5, yielding 2995, but
now with a scale factor of 4. At the client, the scale factor and the integer value of the result are
converted into a decimal number, giving. 2995 which is then rounded to. 30 or thirty cents. Finally, our
calculations are not done over the natural numbers but are done modulo 𝑁𝑁 2 , the modulo of Paillier
encryption. This only poses a problem if an arithmetic operation overflows.

In order to allow multiplication, we create two tables (Scalar Function Tables, SFT), the log-table 𝐿𝐿
and and the antilog- table 𝐸𝐸, using the real valued logarithm and exponential functions. We round
logarithms and exponential values towards the nearest decimal value. We refer to our previous work for
a detailed discussion of the precision needed and the resulting size of the table. This is an important
topic for further work, especially since algebraic identities might be used to decrease the table sizes of
currently about 50 GB. We define the log- table L by
(6) 𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)]

= 𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑥𝑥))

and the antilog or exponential table by

(7) 𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)]

= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (exp(𝑥𝑥))𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∈ Z∗𝑁𝑁 .

To multiply two encrypted values 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥) and 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦), we multiply the log-table entries of the encrypted
values and then lookup the antilog table entry:

𝐸𝐸[𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)] ⋅ 𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)]]
= 𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑥𝑥)) ⋅ 𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑦𝑦)]
= 𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑥𝑥) + log(𝑦𝑦))]
= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (exp(log(𝑥𝑥) + log(𝑦𝑦)))
= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (exp(log(𝑥𝑥 ⋅ 𝑦𝑦)))
= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥 ⋅ 𝑦𝑦)

We therefore define a multiplication between dodrant-homomorphic encrypted values by
(8) 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)

= 𝐸𝐸[𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)] ⋅ 𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)]]

and obtain the identity
(9) 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦) = 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥

⋅ 𝑦𝑦).

In this calculation, additions and multiplications are those of real numbers, as we assume that the
number 𝑁𝑁 = 𝑝𝑝(1 in Equation 1 is sufficiently large to allow no overflows. This calculation also
generalizes to more than two factors. For example, we calculate 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑧𝑧) not as two
separate ∗ -multiplications (𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑧𝑧), but as
(10) 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥

⋅ 𝑦𝑦 ⋅ 𝑧𝑧) = 𝐸𝐸[𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)] ⋅ 𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)] ⋅ 𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑧𝑧)]],

which generalizes to any number of factors.

Similarly, we can reduce division to division of L-table values:

𝐸𝐸[𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)]/𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)]]
= 𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑥𝑥))/𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑦𝑦)]
= 𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑥𝑥) − log(𝑦𝑦))]
= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (exp(log(𝑥𝑥) − log(𝑦𝑦)))
= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (exp(log(𝑥𝑥/𝑦𝑦)))
= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥/𝑦𝑦)

Again, we define

(11) 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)//𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)

= 𝐸𝐸[𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)]/𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)]]

(12) 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)//𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)

= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥/𝑦𝑦).

and obtain with this definition the functional identity

We can calculate an expression with any number of operands joined by ∗ and// operators, but once we
have performed the operation, we have a Paillier-encoded value with multiplier r and are no longer
capable of using it as an operand in further operations.
The basic scheme proposed in previous work9 uses a fixed value 𝑟𝑟 = 1.

This allows comparing the results of calculations with each other as well as other encrypted values, with
causes its own set of dangers, as we discuss below.

Since we have gained the capability to calculate sums and products of sums, we can express many, but
not all SQL queries involving numerical values. In particular, we cannot compare two encrypted
numerical values for other than equality. It would of course be possible to encrypt each numerical value
twice, once with an order preserving encryption, and once with dodrant-homomorphic encryption, as in
CryptDB.13 Unfortunately, the work of Akin and Sunar shows that this has to be done carefully in order
to not allow frequency attacks.1
The size of the log and antilog tables is a concern. A Paillier cyphertext of a number is (at least) 16 B. For
the log table to become useful, it has to contain at the very least numbers corresponding to the
monetary values 0.01, 0.02, …, 100, 000.00 or 107 values. We have to store the key-value pairs
(𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥), 𝐿𝐿[𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)]). The minimum raw size of the log-table is therefore 3.2×108 B or 0.32 GB. Since we are
storing the tables in an LH* structure, this number is not out of reach for distributed memory. The
antilog tables use as keys the encrypted values obtained by arithmetic operations on natural logarithms.
The keys need to have 8 digits after the decimal point and range from 0 to 16.11809565. We need about
48 GB to store the table, without using compression techniques. Since LH* tables can have a load factor
exceeding 90 %, the total storage costs are around 52 GB.

Scalar Function Tables for Dodrant-Homomorphic Encryption
Paillier's cryptosystem encrypts integers whereas many database tables contain decimal numbers with a
fixed precision. Recall that we use a scale factor in order to convert decimal fixed precision numbers to
integers. Multiplication and division of two attribute values will respectively add and subtract the scale
factors for the two attributes.

The log-table is a scalar function table. It is organized as a dictionary that associates the dictionary key
𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥) with the value 𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑥𝑥)). The keys range from 𝜖𝜖1 (2) to 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑅𝑅), where 𝑅𝑅 is the range chosen. Of
course, 𝜖𝜖1 (log(1)) is 𝜖𝜖1 (0) = 1. The Log-table needs to be protected against direct access, as it would
otherwise leak information by adding up values and see whether their sum is a key. If 𝑋𝑋 = 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥) and if
𝑋𝑋 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋 = 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥 + 𝑥𝑥) is not a key, then 𝑥𝑥 > 𝑅𝑅/2. Passing through the keys, just addition with itself reveals
the set 𝑀𝑀(𝑅𝑅/2) = {𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)|𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑅𝑅/2 + 1, … , 𝑅𝑅}}. We repeat this step testing whether the double of an
encrypted value in 𝑀𝑀(𝑅𝑅/2) is in 𝑀𝑀(𝑅𝑅/2) to obtain the set 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑅𝑅/4) = {𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)|𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑅𝑅/4 + 1, … , 𝑅𝑅}}.
This procedure finally yields the encrypted value of 2, namely 𝜖𝜖1 (2), as the dictionary key that can be
added to itself the most times and 𝜖𝜖1 (3) as the second-best value, and so on. This vulnerability is
general, and is caused by using the same Paillier multiplier, i.e. by deterministic encryption.
Strict access control for the SFTs might be operationally difficult. Instead, we can add somewhat
randomly the encryption of sums to the Log-dictionary. Details are left to future work.

The values of the log-table are the expressions 𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑥𝑥)). The logarithm of an integer value is of course
usually not an integer. Paillier's system however only encrypts integers. We calculate the natural
logarithm with a precision of eight digits after the decimal points. This corresponds to using a scale
factor of 4. We could of course choose another base then base 10 for number representation and/or
another base for the logarithm, but it turns out that for our range R, these two choices are quite
reasonable.9 Different choices would result in different table sizes.
The exp-table needs to be much larger, since the keys need to contain all possible products

𝐿𝐿(𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)) ⋅ 𝐿𝐿(𝜖𝜖1 (𝑦𝑦)) = 𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑥𝑥) + log(𝑦𝑦)) = 𝜖𝜖1 (log(𝑥𝑥 ⋅ 𝑦𝑦))

with 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦 ∈ {2, … , 𝑅𝑅}. It has therefore at least 𝑅𝑅 2 keys. This however neglects that we accrue a certain
rounding error in the calculation of the logarithm. Even though the addition of logarithm values is done
in the integer domain and is therefore completely accurate, we are de facto adding up rounded values
and so have to expect occasional rounding errors.
The values of the dictionary constituted by the exp-table are rounded to the same scale factor as before
and then encrypted.
We organize both tables as a scalable distributed data structure LH*. Such a hash-structure can have a
load factor that exceeds 90%. We calculate that both tables would take up less than 100 GB of storage.
In an age where even small laptops now come routinely with more than 4GB storage, the size of the SFT
is no hindrance to implementation. Experiential work more than a decade ago has shown that access
through a distributed hash structure takes less than a milli-second for record look-up.

Dangers of Dodrant-Homomorphic Encryption
Since we are using look-up tables, we have to use some type of deterministic encryption, doing away
with one of the major advantages of Paillier's crypto-scheme. The main problem with deterministic
encryption is the possibility of attacks based on frequencies. The number of times that a certain
encrypted value is taken might be a statistical outlier and if this is the case, then this fact can be used to
determine the unencrypted value. For example, if the most frequent price in the dollar store is 99 cents,
then we just look for the most frequent encrypted value in the price attribute in order to find the

encryption of the 99 cents value. Reversely, if a value itself is an outlier and we use order-preserving
encryption, then we can also determine its encryption from the database.
Often, knowing a few encryptions of peculiar values is in itself not very dangerous. (Of course, a
database administrator might be tempted to replace her salary with the CEO's salary, etc.) However, in
conjunction with the capability to calculate with encrypted data and to compare encrypted values,
determinism becomes quite a bit, or should we say, even more dangerous. Adversaries can expand their
knowledge of plaintext - cipher pairs or they can use algebraic identities to find these pairs.
Assume that we use Paillier multiplier 𝑟𝑟 = 1 in Equation 7. This gives an adversary the capability to
recognize the encrypted value of zero since 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥) = 𝑔𝑔0 𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁 = 1. This might be more of an annoyance
than an exploitable vulnerability, but if the adversary can multiply encrypted value (for example,
because the adversary has gained the privileges of the administrator), then the adversary can find the
encrypted value of 1 because it and 0 are the only solutions to 𝑥𝑥 ⋅ 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥. Similarly, 2 and 0 are the only
solutions to 𝑥𝑥 ⋅ 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑥𝑥, and in general n and 0 to 𝑥𝑥 ⋅ 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑥𝑥 + ⋯ + 𝑥𝑥 with n addends on the right
of the equation. Of course, once an adversary has successfully decrypted 0 and 1, the adversary can
calculate the encryption of 2, 3,…, creating a large, but manageable lookup table for decoding. While
presumably records do not consist only of numerical values, it is easy to imagine that the capability of
decrypting numerical values alone can be leveraged into a more extensive penetration of the database.
A simple operational countermeasure is to only use dodrant-homomorphic encryption on numerical
values that need to be added and multiplied.
Paillier's cryptosystem allows multiplication with constants, so that we obtain yet another class of
algebraic identities for encrypted values, such as 2𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 ⋅ 𝑥𝑥 which again would reveal 𝑥𝑥 = 2. The
traditional use of Paillier's cryptosystem is completely safe, since one value can be encrypted in a
multitude of forms so that evaluating identity is impossible.
In short, besides attacks based on statistical frequency, an adversary can use algebraic identities to
determine the encryption of certain values and then leverage this to build a dictionary of values.

Thwarting Attacks Using Algebraic Identities
An adversary can use algebraic identities if the adversary can calculate with numerical values and
compare the results. The latter can become possible because we need to use deterministic encryption in
order to allow the use of tables. However, in our improved scheme, products are encrypted with a
Paillier multiplier r different from 1. It is therefore impossible to evaluate algebraic identities with a
product on one side and a non-product on the other side.
In order to discuss the implications of picking different Paillier multipliers for products, we need to make
a distinction in the use of numerical attributes in a database table. First, we have numerical attributes
that are not subject to algebraic manipulations. An example would be social security numbers in the US
or identity card numbers in Latin America. There is no need to use dodrant homomorphic encryption on
these. Since they are not subject to frequency attacks (there is one number per individual), but useful
for join operations, these values can be encrypted with any deterministic encryption such as AES. A
second type of numerical attribute sees its value subjected only to addition and multiplication by
constants. This type of attribute can be encrypted with Paillier's scheme with random multipliers. The
third type of attributes allows addition and multiplication of its attributes. Another difference is whether

we allow numerical values to be updated as a result of a calculation. We cannot see how this would be
necessary for a numerical attribute of the first kind. Updating a value for an attribute of the second kind
is also possible, since at worst the Paillier multiplier is determined by the antilogarithm table 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹. An
example for a numerical attribute of the third kind would be prices of items. To determine the total
costs or shipping costs etc. the cloud service would multiply the price of an item with the total number
of the item ordered, then add sales or value-added taxes and maybe insurance costs as a percentage of
the total order value.
We discuss two different scenarios. First, we can assign random Paillier multiplier in Equation 7. After
any multiplication on encrypted numerical values, the products can no longer be compared with any
stored encrypted numerical values and they cannot be factors in further multiplications. Products can
however be added. We can update numerical attributes of the second kind without problems with the
result of numerical calculations on attributes of the second and third kind. This is not the case when
updating values of the third kind since these need to be encoded with a Paillier multiplier of 𝑟𝑟 = 1. The
owner's system or a trusted service would need to decipher each calculated value, encode it with Paillier
multiplier 𝑟𝑟 = 1 and then insert it.

The second possibility is to use a fixed, but hidden constant Paillier multiplier in Equation 7. In this case,
a query can calculate a value 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥) and multiply it with 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟−1 (1) in order to obtain 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟⋅𝑟𝑟−1 (1 ⋅ 𝑥𝑥) = 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥)
and insert this into the table. Unfortunately, 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟−1 (1) leaks 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (1), which in turn leaks 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑛𝑛) for any 𝑛𝑛 ∈
ℕ and allows therefore comparisons of products with integers and therefore the exploitation of
algebraic identities. Other methods such as adding an encrypted value with zero and Paillier multiplier
𝑟𝑟 −1 also do not work for the same reason.
We conclude that to our best knowledge, it is impossible to have the cloud service automatically insert
products into attribute values of the third kind. For example, we will not be able to process
automatically an item-price table with an over-the-board price increase of 3%.

We discuss as an example the calculation of the mean and the variation of a sequence of dodranthomomorphic encrypted numerical values 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥1 ), 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥2 ) … 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ). In order to calculate the mean, we
need to count the number of elements in the selection. Now, calculating the count as 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑛𝑛) would be a
dangerous procedure since this would allow an adversary who intercepts the query and the accesses to
tables to obtain plain text - cypher text values. This is however not necessary as we can treat the
rounded real value of 1/𝑛𝑛 as a constant and multiply using Equation 5. Recall that 1/𝑛𝑛 is encoded as an
1
𝑛𝑛

integer modulo 𝑁𝑁 2 . We now obtain the encrypted mean 𝜇𝜇 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥2 by
𝑛𝑛

1
𝜖𝜖1 (𝜇𝜇) = 𝜖𝜖1 ( � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛

𝑖𝑖=1

= (� 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛

= (� 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1

Here, we first calculate 1/𝑛𝑛(mod 𝑁𝑁) and then use the result as an exponent modulo 𝑁𝑁 2 . The formula of
Koenig-Huygens calculates the variance 𝜎𝜎 2 as the difference between the average of the squares and
the square of averages. Its biggest drawback is the possibility for overflow (a fact very relevant for us as
we need to keep table sizes small and therefore need to limit the range) and the possibility of
accumulating rounding errors. However, its implementation is simple. The average sum of squares is
obtained by
𝑛𝑛

𝑛𝑛

𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 𝑛𝑛 (� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2 /𝑛𝑛) = (𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 𝑛𝑛 (� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2 ))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1

𝑛𝑛

𝑖𝑖=1

= (� 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2 ))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛

= (� 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1

The square of the mean is obtained via
𝑛𝑛

𝑛𝑛

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑖𝑖=1

𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝜇𝜇2 ) = 𝜖𝜖1 (� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 /𝑛𝑛) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 /𝑛𝑛)
𝑛𝑛

= (� 𝜖𝜖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ))1/𝑛𝑛 ∗ (I𝑛𝑛 1𝜖𝜖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ))1/𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1
=1

Both parts are combined by

𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 𝑛𝑛−1 (𝜎𝜎 2 )

𝑛𝑛

𝑛𝑛

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 𝑛𝑛−1 (� − 𝑛𝑛 (� )2 )
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛

= 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 𝑛𝑛 (�
𝑖𝑖=1

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2
𝑛𝑛

𝑛𝑛

𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛

1
)/((𝑛𝑛 � 𝜖𝜖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ))𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
1

𝜖𝜖1 (𝜇𝜇) = (� 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ))𝑛𝑛
?=1

𝑛𝑛

1

∗ (� 𝜖𝜖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ))𝑛𝑛 )
𝑖𝑖=1

In order to avoid overflows, we can employ a two-pass solution, where we first calculate the mean 𝜇𝜇 as

𝑛𝑛

𝜖𝜖1 (𝜇𝜇) = (� 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1

and then

𝑛𝑛

𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 𝑛𝑛 (�(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜇𝜇)2 /𝑛𝑛)
𝑖𝑖=1

𝑛𝑛

= (𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 𝑛𝑛 (�(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜇𝜇)2 ))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1

𝑛𝑛

= (� 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 ((𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇)2 ))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛

= (� 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 − 𝜇𝜇))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛

= (�(𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )/𝜖𝜖1 (𝜇𝜇)) ∗ (𝜖𝜖1 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )/𝜖𝜖1 (𝜇𝜇)))1/𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1

We can even use Welford's one pass incremental method.15 It is based on maintaining a partial mean
𝑖𝑖

𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑥𝑥𝜈𝜈 /𝑛𝑛
𝜈𝜈=1

and partial variance
𝑖𝑖

𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 = (1/𝑖𝑖) �(𝑥𝑥I/ − 𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈 )2
𝜈𝜈=1

and uses the update formula

2
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖−1
+

𝑖𝑖−1
𝑖𝑖

(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇i−1 )2

While it is straightforward to implement this formula using constant multiplication and the *-operator
on encrypted values, the frequent multiplication with constants in the plaintext domain is less attractive
as these translates into exponentiations in the cipher domain and are more involved.

Thwarting Frequency Attacks
Frequency based attacks use known or guessed facts about frequency outliers (such as that the most
common price in the dollar store is 0.99 or that there is only one admitted student of age 14, recently

profiled in the student newspaper). There are quite effective when using statistics on more than one
attribute.
The advantage of non-deterministic encryption lies precisely in the built-in resilience against frequency
attacks as every encrypted value appearing in a database is unique (with overwhelming probability). In
Paillier's scheme, there are basically as many encryptions of a single value (𝑁𝑁 − 1 different Paillier
multipliers to be precise) as there are values that can be encrypted (𝑁𝑁 to be precise). We propose to
encode each value 𝑥𝑥 as a pair

(𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌), 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌))

where 𝜌𝜌 is a small random integer. This is reminiscent of the mathematical construction of an Abelian
group out of a cancellative commutative monoid, for example in constructing the entire numbers from

natural numbers. The user can use a division to recover 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝑥𝑥) as the division of both parts. To add two

encrypted numbers (𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌1 𝑥𝑥1 ), 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌1 )) and (𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌2 𝑥𝑥2 ), 𝜖𝜖2 (𝜌𝜌2 )), we essentially add two fractions
as

i.e. by calculating

𝑝𝑝1 𝑥𝑥1 𝑝𝑝2 𝑥𝑥2 𝑝𝑝1 𝑝𝑝2 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝22𝑥𝑥
+
=
𝑝𝑝1
𝑝𝑝1
𝑝𝑝1 𝑝𝑝2

(𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌1 𝑥𝑥1 ) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌2 ) + 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌1 ) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌2 𝑥𝑥2 ), 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌1 ) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌2 ))
= (𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝜌𝜌1 𝜌𝜌2 𝑥𝑥1 ) + 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝜌𝜌1 𝜌𝜌2 𝑥𝑥2 ), 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝜌𝜌1 𝜌𝜌2 ))
= (𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 2 (𝜌𝜌1 𝜌𝜌2 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝜌𝜌1 𝜌𝜌9 𝑥𝑥2 ), 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝜌𝜌1 𝜌𝜌9 )

whereas the product of the two encrypted numbers is simply

(𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌1 𝑥𝑥1 ) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌9 𝑥𝑥2 ), 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌1 ) ∗ 𝜖𝜖1 (𝜌𝜌9 ))
= (𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝜌𝜌1 𝜌𝜌2 𝑥𝑥1 𝑥𝑥2 ), 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟 (𝜌𝜌1 𝜌𝜌2 )).

These operations generalize immediately to arbitrary numbers of operands.
Frequency based attempts at deciphering are now impossible, and we are still able to calculate sums of
products.

Conclusion
In 2015, Jajodia, Litwin, and Schwarz proposed a stop-gap solutions for homomorphic encryption9 that
used a deterministic variant of Paillier's cryptoscheme and large tables. We identified two weaknesses
that render that scheme insecure and propose a variant that is not subject to these vulnerabilities.
Future work will also have to address the size of the E and L-tables, which we hope to reduce using
algebraic means. Before floating point coprocessors, 8 bit and 16 bit processors were able to emulate all
floating point operations. The same software emulations are applicable to elevate the capability to
calculate with limited range integers (using small tables) to the capability to process floating point
numbers. Whether and how this can be done in a safe manner remains to be seen.

Future work will need to provide a more thorough security assessment, though we are doubtful that at
the current state of the art in Cryptography a formal proof of security can be attempted. The
controversy surrounding CryptDB and its security1–2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 highlights the difficulty in this area.
Finally, there is justified hope that something amounting to almost complete homomorphic encryption
will eventually become possible. In this case, our stop-gap proposal has lost its raison d’être. In the
remaining years (or decades), our proposal seems to be interesting, at least for databases with some
guaranteed privacy but not containing data classified as “Secret”, meaning that its disclosure could bring
death or bodily harm.
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